PROFITS AND RISK: FITTING AN OLD FRAMEWORK TO A NEW AGRICULTURE by Wachenheim, Cheryl J. & Saxowsky, David M.
Agribusiness and Applied Economics Report No. 494 August 2002
Profits and Risk: 
Fitting an Old Framework to
a New Agriculture
Cheryl J. Wachenheim and David M. Saxowsky
Department of Agribusiness and Applied Economics
Agricultural Experiment Station
North Dakota State University
Fargo, North Dakota 58105ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Appreciation is extended to Robert Hearne, Edward Janzen, Jeremy Mattson, and
Richard Taylor for their constructive feedback on a previous draft of this manuscript.  
We would be happy to provide a single copy of this publication free of charge.  You can
address your inquiry to: Carol Jensen, Department of Agribusiness and Applied Economics,
North Dakota State University, P.O. Box 5636, Fargo, ND, 58105-5636, Ph. 701-231-7441, Fax
701-231-7400, e-mail cjensen@ndsuext.nodak.edu .  This publication is also available
electronically at this web site:  http://agecon.lib.umn.edu/.
NDSU is an equal opportunity institution.
NOTICE:
The analyses and views reported in this paper are those of the author(s).  They are not necessarily
endorsed by the Department of Agribusiness and Applied Economics or by North Dakota State
University.
North Dakota State University is committed to the policy that all persons shall have equal access
to its programs, and employment without regard to race, color, creed, religion, national origin, sex, age,
marital status, disability, public assistance status, veteran status, or sexual orientation.
Information on other titles in this series may be obtained from:  Department of Agribusiness and
Applied Economics, North Dakota State University, P.O. Box 5636, Fargo, ND 58105.  Telephone: 701-
231-7441, Fax: 701-231-7400, or e-mail: cjensen@ndsuext.nodak.edu.
Copyright © 2002 by Cheryl J. Wachenheim and David M. Saxowsky.  All rights reserved. 
Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means,
provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies.TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
L i s t  o f  T a b l e s................................................................i i
L i s t  o f  F i g u r e s ...............................................................i i
A b s t r a c t ................................................................... i i i
H i g h l i g h t s.................................................................. i v
1.  Introduction ...............................................................1
2.  Redefining the Resources of Production Agriculture ...............................3
2.1  Management and Labor ..............................................3
2.2  Information ........................................................5
2.3  Risk Bearing Capacity ...............................................6
2.4  Risk Management ...................................................7
3 .   D i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  o f  E q u i t y  I n v e s t m e n t  a s  a  R i s k  B e a r i n g  S t r a t e g y .....................8
3.1  Equity Diversification Alternatives ....................................1 0
3.2  Changing State Legislation to Make Equity Diversification Possible ..........1 0
4 .   C o n c l u s i o n ..............................................................1 1
R e f e r e n c e s .................................................................1 3
A p p e n d i x  -  A  D i s c u s s i o n  o f  F a r m  O w n e r s h i p  L e g i s l a t i o n ............................1 6ii
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1 Tools for Risk Management in Production Agriculture .........................8
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure
1 Inputs to Production Agriculture: Traditional Framework .......................2
2 Inputs to Production Agriculture: Revised Framework ..........................4
  iii
ABSTRACT
Textbooks in agricultural economics characterize resources used in production
agriculture into four categories:  land, labor, capital, and entrepreneurial ability.  Profit is
presented as earned by management.  This traditional list of resources is respecified. 
Management is redefined as a specialized type of labor and two additional resources, information
and risk bearing capacity, are added.  Profits accrue not to management but to those able to bear
the risk inherent in production agriculture.  Equity diversification is a means for farmers to
provide and manage this resource and, thus, earn economic profits.  Producer education and the
repeal or amendment of legislation restricting the ability of farmers to diversify their equity
investment are needed.   
Key Words:   agriculture, equity diversification, farm management, information, 
                        resources, riskiv
HIGHLIGHTS
The traditional classification of resources in production agriculture includes land, capital,
labor, and management.  However, the traditional model does not satisfactorily explain what we
observe.  Re-specification of the resources facilitates identification of the source of profits and
alternatives for sector participants.  Resources are respecified to include land, capital, labor,
information, and risk bearing capacity. 
•   Management and labor are combined into a single resource category.  It is argued that
management is better viewed as a specialized type of labor.
•   Information is added as a unique resource used in production agriculture.  Accurate,
timely, and detailed information is important for good decision making, and it should
be considered a distinct resource used by farm operators.
•   Risk bearing is differentiated from risk management; the latter is considered an
activity of management.  Risk management involves adopting tools to reduce risks
associated with production, marketing, and financing.  Risk management tools have
explicit or implicit costs which tend to negate economic profits.    
Risk bearing can provide economic profits.  
•   Diversification of equity is a tool by which to manage risk without sacrificing
economic profits.
•   The extent to which farm owners will diversify their equity investment is limited by
their independent nature, communication difficulties between them, a lack of
education regarding the benefits of, and alternatives for, this tool, and policies
limiting the organization of farm ownership (e.g., so-called corporate farming laws).
•   The potential scope of equity diversification by farmers is large.  Producers could
diversify, for example, by investing in operations of different types, within different
geographic locations, or producing for different markets.  Equity sharing of
productive assets or enterprises among agricultural producers may not only reduce
risk but production costs as well.  Facilitating entities could serve to help identify
potential equity sharing partners, evaluate and compare risk and returns from
perspective operations within which to invest, and evaluate the impact of these
investments on an individual's portfolio.  Dramatic advances in communication
during recent years greatly reduce the cost of identifying suitable partners. 
•   Equity sharing is restricted or prohibited in nine states.  There are sometimes
compelling arguments for the existence of these laws, but there are other means by
which to obtain benefits such as the continued existence of the family farm and
protection of rural communities and the environment.  In many cases, these
alternatives are already in place.  Furthermore, allowing farmers to share equity may
increase the chances a family farm will survive.
•   The challenge in facilitating producer efforts to increase profitability by increasing
risk bearing ability is two-fold.  First, producers must be educated regarding the
advantages of diversifying their equity investment.  Second, policymakers should be
urged to carefully consider how adopting new or revising existing (e.g.,
anti-corporate farming) legislation will affect the ability of farmers to provide the
resource of risk bearing to the farm operation.* Cheryl J. Wachenheim is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Agribusiness and Applied
Economics at North Dakota State University, Fargo.  David Saxowsky is the Director of Agricultural
Communications and an Associate Professor in the Department of Agribusiness and Applied Economics
at North Dakota State University, Fargo   
1 Here, production agriculture is narrowly defined to include production and marketing of
agricultural commodities produced on the farm.
2 Resource mobility is not defined literally but rather by use.  Although it can be altered by capital
improvements, the land resource is fixed in its locale.  It is mobile in that it can be used in other
alternative productive activities.
Profits and Risk:  Fitting an Old Framework to a New Agriculture
Cheryl J. Wachenheim and David M. Saxowsky
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1.  Introduction 
Structural and other changes continue to redefine the agricultural sector.  This evolution
has been well-documented and includes, for example, increasing farm size and specialization,
decreasing farm numbers, increasing use of production contracts, and evolving markets for
specialty products and those with otherwise unique characteristics (e.g., organic).  The causes,
nature, extent, and results of these changes have been and continue to be widely discussed and
debated throughout both the popular and academic literature.  In general, the changes suggest
that the pendulum is swinging from the long-held characterization of production agriculture as a
near perfectly competitive industry to one increasingly characterized by imperfect competition.
1
Textbooks in agricultural economics characterize the resources used in production
agriculture into four categories:  land, capital, labor, and entrepreneurial ability (management)
(Figure 1).  Land defines the soil and the environment within which the farm is contained. 
Capital includes resources that are tangible and depreciable such as farm machinery, buildings,
and brood cows, as well as equity.  Labor is considered strictly the physical act of performing a
task while management defines the process of controlling the other resources.  Decision making,
innovation, gaining access to and use of information, and risk management have all traditionally
been considered functions of the management resource.  Although managers are motivated by a
variety of goals (e.g., profit, quality of life, risk aversion), within the narrow confines of
textbook neoclassic economics, they seek only to maximize profit.  
When considered a perfectly competitive market, the assumptions defining production
agriculture are strict.  Under perfect competition, there exist: 1) a large number of buyers and
sellers, none of whom individually influence price, 2) homogeneous products, 3) free entry and
exit, and 4) information that is readily available for and accessible by all market participants
(Rhodus, Baldwin, and Henderson).  The assumption of free entry and exit defines all resources
as instantaneously and freely mobile.
2  Free entry and exit, perfect information, and the notion
that the behavior of rational market participants striving to maximize profits can be predicted
with certainty, result in a risk free environment.  2
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Within this environment, textbooks identify fair return to the use of the resources of land,
capital, labor, and management to be rent, interest, wages, and profit.  In Agricultural Economics
and Agribusiness, Cramer, Jensen and Southgate (1997, p.79) state, “This grouping accords with
the view of resource earnings held by firm operators, with the payment to land called ‘rent’, the
earnings of labor its ‘wage’, the earnings of capital its ‘interest’, and rewards to management
being ‘profit’.” 
The purpose of this paper is to revisit this traditional classification of resources.  Doing
so will facilitate identification of the source(s) of profits in the sector and definition of
alternatives for its profit-seeking participants.  Specifically, it is argued that the re-specification
of resources combines labor and management into a single resource category and two resource
categories, information and risk bearing capacity, be added.  A brief discussion supporting
reclassifying the management resource as labor and the specification of a resource called
information are first presented.  This re-emphasizes a fundamental economic principal: economic
profits are not generated if resources earn only the value of their contribution to an economic
activity.  An argument is then presented to add risk bearing capacity as an additional resource
category.  It is contended that a capacity to bear risk can be a source of economic profits.  In
making this argument, a wide array of risk management tools available to farmers and their
effectiveness in shifting risk is discussed.  It is emphasized that the cost of using these tools can
negate economic profits.  Thereafter, an explanation of how bearing risk can generate profits is
presented.  Discussion of an alternative which can increase the risk bearing ability of farmers
and, thus, allow them to earn economic profits follows. 3
2.  Redefining the Resources of Production Agriculture  
Changes in production agriculture warrant a reconsideration of the economic framework
used to describe the forces shaping it.  Specifically, economists should re-evaluate how well
existing models explain and predict decisions made by, and the varying levels of success of, farm
owners.  The traditional economic framework does not explain satisfactorily what is observed. 
Why do some farms earn a profit while others with comparable resources do not?  Why do some
sectors of the agricultural marketing channel earn profits while others do not?
Hypotheses and associated empirical support for a variety of economic models that
attempt to explain these phenomenon are found throughout the academic literature and the
popular press.  For example, differential market power between participants within the marketing
channel is proposed to explain differences in profitability.  It is argued that profits accrue to
those participants comprising the concentrated industries selling inputs to, and buying products
from, the farms that comprise a less concentrated sector.  Economies of size is used to explain
why some farms are profitable and others are not.  Production and market efficiencies, it is
argued, allow larger farms to earn greater returns than their smaller counterparts.  
While sometimes compelling evidence is presented, we lack a theory that well explains
and predicts which participants in the agricultural sector will earn economic profits.  A point of
departure in the search for a more valid and reliable model is to re-specify the resources of
production agriculture.  First, it is argued that management is not a profit generating resource,
but rather is a specialized type of labor earning a wage associated with the value it provides. 
Therefore, the traditionally separated labor and management resources can be considered a
single resource.  An argument is made for the explicit inclusion of two additional resource
categories: 1) information and 2) risk bearing capacity.  Each of the proposed alterations to the
more traditional model is discussed in some detail in the following sections.  Figure 2 shows the
resulting proposed framework defining the resources of production agriculture.
2.1.  Management and Labor  
It has been noted that the traditional model identifies fair return to the use of the
resources of land, capital, labor, and management as rent, interest, wages, and profit.  It shows
that the existence of or potential to generate economic profits can be attributed to the innovation,
decision making, or other skills “owned” by the management resource.  As production
agriculture evolves and profit margins continue to tighten, the level of skill with which its
productive enterprises must be managed increases.  The skills required to, for example, identify
and develop niche markets and produce products appropriate for them are different than those
necessary to produce and market an agricultural commodity.  Although management tasks have
changed, our consideration of such within the traditional economic framework has not.  The
abilities of management to direct farm resources to their best-value use have continued to be
identified as the source of profits.  That is, we continue to conclude that good managers should
earn a profit.  4
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Figure 2.  Inputs to Production Agriculture: 
Revised Framework3Only when management is immobile, and paid a wage less than its value to the firm, is economic
profit earned.  We concede that the management resource for, e.g., a family farm operation, may be
relatively immobile in the short run.  However, so too is the labor resource the farmer provides.  These
resources are only immobile over the longer run if the farm’s owner is not motivated solely by profit.  
4The National Agricultural Statistics Service of the USDA provides state yield and price
information (Patrick).  Cooperative Extension Services provide a wide array of information about
resource use, production practices, and the economic viability of various agricultural enterprises as well
as situation and outlook information.  The most comprehensive source of price and other market
information is the USDA Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS).  In fact, most other publicly available
information about agricultural markets simply summarizes or otherwise revises that provided by the
AMS.  
5
Alternatively, it is our contention that management should be viewed as a specialized
type of labor.  This is consistent with the traditional model in that, to successfully bid for their
use in a particular enterprise, resources, including management, must be paid a return equivalent
to their value in generating net income.  When resources are mobile, this is the return offered
from their next best alternative use.  Within a perfectly competitive framework, if a resource can
earn more elsewhere, its price is bid up by profit seeking producers to a level at which it earns no
economic profits.  It is here emphasized that this holds true for the management resource. 
Innovativeness, decision making, a willingness to bear risk, and other psychological
characteristics and skills defining management simply make it more valuable and, accordingly, it
demands a higher wage.  This is demonstrated in the marketplace by differences in wages paid to
managers at various levels within a firm or to managers in equivalent positions at different firms. 
Under the assumptions of perfect competition, particularly that of resource mobility,
management does not earn economic profit.
3  Whether “labor” or “management,” individuals in
production agriculture receive a return equivalent to their contribution to the farm.  Labor and
management do not, therefore, warrant consideration as unique resource categories.
2.2.  Information
Information warrants identification as a unique resource used in production agriculture.
Accurate, timely, detailed information is important for good decision making just as an
appropriate soil type is important for crop growth.  Fortunately, there is an extensive array of
detailed information available about various agricultural enterprises and the production practices
appropriate for use within them and about agricultural and other markets important to farmers
(e.g., financial markets).  Historically, much of the information used by farmers and other
participants in the agricultural sector has been provided by public institutions and is, therefore,
publicly available (Schroeder, et al.).  The primary public sources of agricultural production and
market information are the National Agricultural Statistics Service and other agencies of the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) and land grant universities through their Agricultural
Experiment Stations and Cooperative Extension Services.
4
  
There are also private sources for information about historic, current, and expected
conditions in agricultural markets (e.g., Cattle Fax).  However, there remain compelling
arguments for the public collection and dissemination of information.  Therein exist economies
of size.  Furthermore, market information is likely to be under-collected privately.  Its value is5 If the risk of less than or less timely than expected cash flow or net income can be absorbed by
the operation because excess equity is available, the owners would expect a higher return on their equity
investment in return for bearing this risk.
6
not known until it is used and it is difficult to limit use of the information by others once
disseminated.
Regardless of its source, information is and will continue to be a distinct resource used by
farm owners and operators for decision making.  While we have noted that public information is
available to producers and, to some extent, public agents are available to interpret this
information in a manner meaningful to individual producers, it is likely this task will
increasingly be provided by private entities.  As such, the cost of obtaining this resource will
shift from society to farm owners.  The extent and nature of the market for private information
will depend on the willingness of farmers and other market participants to provide a fair return to
those who provide this resource.  If information continues to be a public good, managers who are
more skilled at obtaining, analyzing, and using it will demand a higher wage than those less
skilled.
2.3.  Risk Bearing Capacity
Similarly warranting explicit consideration as a resource used in production agriculture is
the ability to bear risk.  Although risk has always been part of production agriculture, farmers are
no different than others in that they are, in general and in most circumstances, risk adverse.  That
is, they accept risk because doing so increases expected profits (or provides other, sometimes
intangible, benefits). 
Alternatively, for a fair return, farm owners can hire external agents to bear risk. 
Providing a fair return means that farmers do not lay claim to economic profits when risks are
borne by others.  Just as a farm manager must decide whether to use equity financed land in the
expectation a fair return will accrue to the equity investment or whether to pay others to provide
this resource (e.g., cash rent), (s)he must decide whether the farm owner will bear risks or will
rather pay others to do so (e.g., an insurance company).  Those ultimately bearing the risks
inherent in production agriculture do so with the expectation of a fair return. 
Many of our traditional measures of risk (e.g., standard deviation) represent “upside” as
well as “downside” risk.  However, unless owners are concerned about the potential for tax
liability, the relevant risk is “downside” risk, for example that of less than or less timely than
expected cash flow or net income.
5  Managing this risk involves anticipating the potential for
undesired events or circumstances and, when cost effective, taking measures to avoid them or
their consequences.  Managing risk can be considered a manager’s responsibility.  Bearing risk is
not.  The distinction is important and it is later argued that risk bearing capacity can be a source
of profits while managing risk is not.  In the following section, the tools available for risk
management and the cost of their use are discussed to support the argument that risk
management does not earn economic profit.  Characterization of the risk bearing resource as a
source of profits is then presented.  An alternative by which farm owners can provide this6 Those for which society is bearing the risk without extracting due profits, e.g., subsidization of
crop insurance.
7
resource, diversification of equity investment, is then discussed, as are actions which will
facilitate its adoption.     
  
2.4.  Risk Management
Risks in production agriculture include those associated with production, marketing, and
financing.  Risk management tools available to farmers today by and large help them manage but
not bear risk.  Nearly all available risk management strategies, with perhaps the exception of
those offered to producers by society,
6 have an explicit (e.g., payment of an insurance premium)
and/or implicit (e.g., foregone revenues) cost associated with their use.  These costs tend to
negate expected economic profits.  A brief review of the tools available to manage production,
marketing, and financial risks in production agriculture and the cost of their use is provided in
Table 1 and discussed here to demonstrate this point.   
There are various means by which farm owners can reduce production risk.  However,
employing strategies to reduce the likelihood of an undesirable production event have associated
costs.  For example, increasing the likelihood field work will be timely by carrying excess
machinery capacity has an implicit cost, the otherwise expected earnings from the invested
capital.  Applying chemicals to reduce or eliminate potential weeds and insects and thereby
reduce the risk of lower than expected crop yields has an explicit cost, that of purchasing and
applying the chemicals.  Diversification of the farm operation can reduce production risk by
reducing the consequences of an undesired event.  A farm can be diversified by increasing the
number of enterprises (e.g., crop and livestock enterprises on a single farm) or including in the
farm operation geographically separated enterprises or those that use a diversity of resources or
production practices (e.g., growing several different varieties of corn).  Managing risk through
diversification may also provide other advantages such as facilitating the use of labor and other
resources (e.g., because the time at which resources are required varies between enterprises) and
improving yield (e.g., because of the benefits of crop rotation).  In spite of its advantages,
because diversification reduces the size of individual enterprises, a cost is generally associated
with its use as a risk reduction strategy.  This cost may be explicit (e.g., increased production
cost) or implicit (e.g., reduced revenues).  The cost of another production risk management tool,
subsidized crop insurance, is borne as an explicit cost, in part by the farmer through premiums
and in part by the taxpayer.  
There are also costs associated with managing market and financial risk.  The cost of
strategies to manage market risk may be explicit (e.g., the premium on an option contract) or
implicit.  The strategies of spreading sales or forward contracting, for example, may have an
implicit cost, e.g., foregone revenue.  That of qualifying or maintaining eligibility for
government programs may include administrative and other explicit costs, but may also include
foregone revenues.  Financial risks are similarly reduced by strategies which pose an explicit
cost (e.g., the premium for insurance carried, the interest cost associated with maintaining
borrowed financial reserves) or an implicit cost (e.g., foregone revenue or increased cost because
capital expenditures to increase production or efficiency were postponed or not made).7 There is also substantial risk in the agribusiness sector.  Agribusinesses and others, for example,
take on the risk associated with developing technologies in both the input and output markets.
8
Table 1.  Tools for Risk Management in Production Agriculture
TYPE OF RISK TOOL FOR RISK MANAGEMENT
POTENTIAL OR EXPECTED COSTS
EXPLICIT IMPLICIT
PRODUCTION
Investment in lower risk enterprises Foregone revenues
Diversification of enterprises
(e.g., production practices, enterprise
type, geographic location)
Increased production cost Foregone revenues
MARKETING 












Spreading sales; use of forward




Hedging Brokerage fee Foregone revenues





Increased overhead cost Foregone revenues
Deferring or reducing capital
investments
Lease or rental expense Reduced efficiency
(increased production cost
or foregone revenues)
* Crop and revenue assurance insurance can also be considered tools by which to reduce
   production and/or marketing risk.
3.  Diversification of Equity Investment as a Risk Bearing Strategy
Risk cannot be engineered out of production agriculture.
7  Government programs have
thus far dictated that society take on some of the risk–public monies fund, for example,
commodity programs, subsidized crop insurance, and disaster payments.  Other risks have been
efficiently spread or transferred away from the farm operation through external economic agents
who provide the risk bearing resource (Johnson 2000).  The remaining risk must either be
managed internally or borne by the farm owner.  9
The extent to which the public will be willing to continue accepting risks inherent in
production agriculture is uncertain.  Internal resources (e.g., owner equity) or external agencies
assuming the remaining risk will continue to demand payment for doing so, thus eroding or
negating economic profits in production agriculture.  Alternatively, in other sectors of the
economy, business owners can acquire profits without bearing substantial risk.  In these sectors,
a well-designed business structure can support diversification of equity investment among
multiple owners.  Because particular organizational structures facilitate diversification of an
equity portfolio, they allow business owners to bear risk, that is, to manage risk without
sacrificing economic profits.  
The reason is well-understood.  As demonstrated by Modigliani and Miller, an asset (e.g.,
a farm enterprise) held as part of a portfolio (e.g., of farms or farm enterprises) is usually less
risky than this same asset held in isolation.  The expected return from a portfolio of assets is the
weighted expected return from each asset.  The expected riskiness of an investment, however, is
its contribution to the riskiness of the portfolio of assets held.  The more diversified are the
returns from assets held in the portfolio, the greater the risk reduction from holding the assets in
a portfolio of assets rather than individually.  The advent of mutual funds and other investment
alternatives has facilitated the ability of equity investors to diversify risk.  In the same way,
equity diversification through investment in various assets (e.g., machinery, buildings) or
business entities (e.g., farms) would allow farm owners to bear risk.  By bearing (rather than
shifting) risk, farm owners thus become entitled to accrue profits.  However, this basic tool is
underutilized in production agriculture, particularly among farms organized as sole
proprietorships or partnerships. 
Production agriculture appears to be the only sector in our economy that expects owners
of small businesses to invest a majority of their assets in a single firm and, in states with anti-
corporate farming legislation, requires that the ownership of the business be held by no more
than a small group of relatives.  The independent nature of farmers and communication
difficulties between them and a lack of producer education regarding the benefits of, and
alternatives for, equity diversification likely contribute to the lack of the use of this alternative
among farmers.  Furthermore, policies limiting the organization of farm ownership can greatly
impede the adoption of this strategy, one which has the potential to reduce risk without eroding
economic profits.  Restrictions on the source of equity investment in production agriculture
reduce the ability of farm owners to bear risk.  [So-called anti-corporate farming laws negate or
severely limit equity diversification among farm owners.  The nature and rationale of such are
discussed in more detail in the appendix.]  Alternatively, agribusiness firms and those in other
economic sectors widely use the strategy of diversification of equity investment to allow owners
to bear risk, that is to manage risk without sacrificing expected profits.
Opponents to reducing impediments to shared equity investment as a means to improve
the risk bearing capacity of farm owners might argue that the cooperative structure already
allows producers to share equity.  However, the one member/one vote rule of cooperative
organization denies producers the ability to share in decision making in proportion to their equity
contribution and the amount of risk they hold as a result.  Opponents might further argue that
value added, so called “new generation” cooperatives, provide producers with a vehicle for
diversification.  However, membership in such generally requires additional equity rather than
diversifies investment of existing equity.10
In spite of laws and attitudes which impede its adoption, there is good reason to consider
the potential of diversified equity investment as a risk bearing strategy for farm owners. 
Economies of size reduce the number of enterprises in which one farm family can invest.  In fact,
it is increasingly the case that, to grow or maintain a viable size operation, producers must resort
to debt financing; in effect receiving the financier as the outside investor.  The difficulty arises in
the nature of debt payment, which is designed to be of a specific amount payable at a specific
time, versus equity payment, which is by nature responsive to the production and market risk
inherent in production agriculture.  In effect, by using debt financing to reduce production and
market risk through diversification or other means, the producer increases financial risk.
3.1.  Equity Diversification Alternatives
The potential scope of equity diversification by farm owners is large.  Producers could
diversify, for example, by investing in operations of different types (e.g., a livestock producer
investing in one or more crop enterprises), operating within different geographic locations, or
producing for different markets (e.g., grain targeted for a commodity market versus a certified
organic operation aimed at a growing niche market).  Equity sharing of productive assets or
enterprises among agricultural producers may not only reduce risk but production costs as well. 
Coordinated machinery sharing by producers in regions where machinery is needed at different
times will reduce capital investment cost.  If the pool of sharing producers is well-selected,
planned machinery and equipment needs would not overlap.  Custom combiners have long
capitalized on differing harvest times between geographic regions.  
Facilitating entities could serve to help identify potential equity sharing partners, evaluate
and compare risk and returns from perspective operations within which to invest, and evaluate
the impact of these investments on an individual’s portfolio (i.e., expected return and risk). 
Dramatic advances in communication during recent years (e.g., the Internet) greatly reduce the
cost of identifying and collaborating with suitable partners.  Because some equity sharing
arrangements, if successful, might promote reduced capital expenditures by farmers, those
agribusinesses likely to be affected might gain by pro-actively internalizing the benefits.  For
example, developing a program wherein assets are leased by period of use rather than annually
may allow dealers to reduce the cost to participating producers and increase their own revenues.  
Options by which the risk borne by farm owners can be reduced through equity
diversification are limited only by the imagination and, in nine states, laws which restrict or
prohibit it.  Thus, there exists a compelling reason to reexamine how our policies are, first,
hindering movement towards the natural risk management mechanism of diversification (one
that is of no or low cost to society) and, second, how we are facilitating it.  The first step is
simply to make it possible by eliminating or rewriting existing legislation.
3.2.  Changing State Legislation to Make Equity Diversification Possible  
The most obvious policy to revisit is ironically that which was initially designed and
subsequently defended as a means to enhance the ability of small, family farms to survive.  This
paper has demonstrated that the risk bearing ability of farm owners can be an important source of
profits in production agriculture.  However, progress in increasing the risk bearing ability of
farm owners through equity diversification is not likely without the repeal or amendment of state11
laws restricting or prohibiting equity investment in farms by non-family members.  There are
sometimes compelling arguments for the existence of such laws.  However, we argue that the
benefits now attributed to legislatively mandated farm structure (i.e., saving the family farm,
protecting rural communities and the environment) can be maintained without anti-corporate
farming laws.  Reasonable alternatives to addressing societal concerns about the impact of farm
structure on the community and the environment exist and in many cases are already in place. 
Furthermore, allowing farmers to share equity, including accepting outside equity investment,
may increase the chances a “community and environmentally friendly” family farm will survive. 
Undesired impacts of changes in the equity financing of local farms on society (e.g., reduced
local purchasing and community involvement by farmers) can be avoided by amending statutes
to allow for outside equity to flow into production agriculture while preserving local control. 
Concerns about the impact of farm structure on the environment are unnecessary when there
exists a system of well-written laws regarding the production practices of farms and their
environmental impacts.  With these safeguards in place, producers will be free, but not
compelled, to improve their risk bearing capacity through diversification of their equity
investment.  Outside equity will not flow into production agriculture to share risk unless
producers allow it and economics encourages it.
4.  Conclusion
The present framework within which the resources of production agriculture are
considered benefits from the redefinition of management as a specialized type of labor, one
which in equilibrium demands a return equivalent to the value it provides.  Furthermore,
consideration of information and the ability to bear risk have become important to understanding
the forces and interactions in production agriculture.  Explicit consideration of them as resource
categories is thus warranted. 
Production agriculture has changed and continues to change.  Profit margins are
tightening and farmers face increasingly concentrated markets both for purchasing inputs and
selling outputs.  Our nation continues to lose farms.  However, by evaluating the industry within
our existing framework, we continue to expect those operating under good management to 
survive and continue to prosper.  Those managers skilled in obtaining and using information and
managing risk will continue to generate profits.  
Alternatively, it has here been argued that, no matter how skilled, when managers are
rewarded for the value they provide to the farm, no economic profits are earned by the farm
owner.  Alternative profit sources need to be identified.  That considered in detail within this
paper is increasing the ability of the farm owner to bear risk, specifically through diversification
of their equity investment.  Advances in communication and other technologies have greatly
reduced transactions costs, and will facilitate the ability of producers to communicate, evaluate
and compare risk and returns from their perspective operations, and, where allowed, reduce their
risk through diversification by investing equity in one another’s operations or sharing equity-
owned assets (e.g., machinery).  
The challenge in facilitating producer efforts to increase profitability by increasing risk
bearing ability is two-fold.  First, producers must be educated regarding the advantages of
diversifying their equity investment.  This process will be facilitated by explicitly specifying the12
ability to bear risk as a resource in production agriculture.  Second, laws must be changed to
allow producers to fully diversify their equity investment.  Policymakers and others involved in
or influencing production agriculture should consider how those in related business sectors have
diversified risk and identify those mechanisms most likely to benefit agricultural producers. 
Policymakers should carefully and more explicitly consider how adopting new or revising
existing (e.g., anti-corporate farming) legislation will affect the ability of farmers to provide the
resource of risk bearing to the farm operation.13
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APPENDIX – A Discussion of Farm Ownership Legislation
  
Traditionally farmers have had the majority of their assets invested in the farm business,
even in states where non-family investors are allowed.  Most farms are household based, family
operations organized as an individual or family (sole) proprietorship or partnership (Welsh). 
However, the structure of production agriculture is changing.  Corporate farms are increasing in
number as the number of individual family operations, part owner/operators, partnerships, full
owners, and tenants is decreasing (Thomas, et al.).
  
In most states in the United States, the corporate structure for, and outside ownership of,
the resources used in production agriculture (e.g., land, facilities, livestock) are allowed. 
However, nine states (Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
South Dakota, and Wisconsin) legislatively limit the corporate structure or outside investment
(Welsh, Bahls, Knoeber, Johnson 1995, Stayton, Krause).  The strictest law is that found in
North Dakota.  [A recent Rural Life Poll shows continuing support for this legislation among
farmers (Institute for Regional Studies).]  The fact that all states with so called anti-corporate
farming legislation exempt the family farm indicates policymakers recognize that the corporate
form of organization is not itself a threat (Johnson 1995, Krause).
Rather, concern about real, perceived, or anticipated effects of changes in the structure or
organization of production agriculture has fueled adoption of legislation limiting investment in
the sector’s resources.  There is mixed opinion on the effect of these laws.  Many argue
legislation is not effective at protecting a structure of family farms in favor of continued
concentration (Bahls, Knoeber, Johnson 1995, Stayton).  Hurt; Cecelski and Kerr; and Stayton
further note that such state legislation, when based on social goals, may inherently protect
potential inefficiencies and in fact shift economic growth in the sector out of the state.  In fact,
valid competitiveness concerns exist when states independently impose requirements on firms
operating within their state.  This issue has been well-explored for various industries and a
multitude of issues ranging from environmental restrictions on agricultural production to term
limits for our nation's legislators.  
Arguments supporting anti-corporate farming laws include a social desire to protect our
agrarian heritage, and a belief that corporate farms have undesirable outcomes.  There is general
agreement within the literature that the intent of anti-corporate farming legislation has been to
protect the family farm (Bahls, Powers, Stayton).  Supporters argue that family farms should be
protected because they represent the ideal on which this nation was founded.  The perception is
that larger farms (corporate farms) benefit from economies of size and, thus, threaten the
survival of smaller farms (family farms) (Welsh, Johnson 1995).  However, the extent to which
this is true and is an appropriate rationale to legislate farm structure has been long debated. 
Others favoring anti-corporate farming legislation support their position with evidence or
assertion that corporate farming has undesirable outcomes for society, especially local
communities and the environment (Welsh).  Although reality is far from definitive, the focus of
the literature and popular press is asymmetrically weighted towards the virtues of small and
medium-sized farms, family farms, and independent producers and against large farms and
corporate farms.  [A number of terms are used in the literature to differentiate farms by17
organization or characteristics.  The question of whether large farms and corporate farms can be
appropriately lumped together for discussion has not been sufficiently addressed.]
 The majority of the relevant literature provides evidence or otherwise asserts that a
structure of production agriculture based on smaller sized farms results in more socially and/or
economically healthy rural communities (Hassebrook and Cleaveland, USDA, Wallace, Bahls,
Drabenstott, Lins, Northwest Area Foundation, Cecelski and Kerr, Daniels, MacCannell,
Goldschmidt).  Two explanatory theses have been offered.  First, it has been frequently argued
that smaller or independently owned farms are more likely to purchase their agriculture inputs
and do their personal shopping locally (Carlin; Lawrence, Otto, and Meyer; Paul; Drabenstott;
MacCannell).  Second, it is argued that independent producers or those with smaller farms tend
to believe they have more of a stake in, and are therefore more involved in, the local community
(USDA; Paul; Fulton and Gillespie; MacCannell).  Bahls and MacCannell argue that this is, at
least in part, due to an increase in absentee ownership of larger farms.  There are, however,
conflicting conclusions within the literature about the effect of farm structure on local
communities (Johnson 1995).  Hefferman and Campbell, for example, concluded that the
presence of corporate agriculture in the Midwest appears to enhance, rather than harm as
asserted by Goldschmidt and subsequent work, the viability of rural communities.
The literature in general also provides evidence or otherwise asserts that small farms are
more sustainable and better protect the environment (Potter and Lobley, Paul, Bahls, Thomas et
al., Northwest Area Foundation, MacCannell).  However, again reality is far from clear.  Ervin
and Smith point out that how industrialization of agriculture affects environmental quality
depends on pollution processes, the rate and nature of technology and technology adoption, and
environmental regulations.  They assert that evidence from other sectors suggests that more
industrialized farms will adopt new technology, including that which reduces the negative
impact of production agriculture on the environment, earlier and at a faster rate and may have
more ability, but less willingness, to do so.
Finally, there are those who argue against investment in agriculture by outsiders because
they are perceived as undesirable in certain regions and farming activities (Krause).  Particular
concerns about equity investment by external agents are the resulting distance between
ownership and management and that the corporate structure generally used for such provides
limited liability.  Roy argues that, under corporate organization, when firm ownership is diffuse,
managers are not accountable to owners.  He asserts that managers not sufficiently accountable
may engage in activities that shareholders (i.e., equity owners) do not endorse.  
The corporate structure is of concern because owner liability for the actions of the
business is limited.  Prohibiting corporate farms effectively prohibits farm owners from limited
liability protection.  Liability is a particularly important consideration in production agriculture
because of the sector’s unique relationship to the environment.  However, there exist in
agriculture and in other economic sectors, mechanisms, often legislated, which reduce the risk of
environmental damage.  For example, processing plants occupy an important position within the
agribusiness marketing channel.  There are a few who would argue that the organizational
structure of these entities should be restricted because limited liability protection may motivate
owners’ decision making to the expense of the environment.  Rather, laws directly (e.g., by
specifying allowed filtering technology) or indirectly (e.g., by specifying maximum nutrient18
loads in waste water) govern business practices.  There is in fact already an extensive set of laws
which govern practices used in production agriculture and the allowable environmental impact of
their use.  As the public becomes more aware of and educated about the relationship between
farming and the environment, and the technology by which to measure and identify sources of
environmental damage improves, increasingly strict environmental regulations governing
production agriculture continue to evolve.  The same holds true for other issues where limited
liability may otherwise be an important argument against the corporate organization for
production agriculture (e.g., worker safety).  In fact, allowing outside or shared investment may
encourage adoption of farming practices which minimize environmental impact, improve worker
safety, and so on.  Producers may be both more willing (e.g., as the details of the operation are
more carefully scrutinized) and, because of outside investment, more able, to adopt such
practices.  It is not a giant leap of reason, for example, to expect a producer soliciting a potential
investor to be well-prepared with up-to-date, well-organized manure management records that
otherwise may not be kept.  